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Grasping the Intangible: How to Interpret “Articles” Under the Tariff Act and ClearCorrect
Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n
Christopher P. Mazza
The exponential rate of advancement of technology in recent years has made it difficult
to apply antiquated statutes to situations and devices that could not possibly have been
contemplated at the time the statutes were written. This predicament has forced the modern
judiciary and other agencies capable of statutory interpretation to stretch the meaning of words
within statutes and expand the traditional understanding of those statutes. This comment
addresses one such issue: the interpretation of, and thus the jurisdiction over, “articles” as read
in Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §1337 (“Section 337”).
Section 337 deals with unfair practices in import trade and gives the International Trade
Commission (“ITC”) the ability to enact equitable remedies and issue remedial orders against
products that infringe valid intellectual property in the United States.1 Most significant to the
goal of this comment, Section 337 allows the ITC to cast a wide jurisdictional net over “articles
that infringe” valid intellectual property.2 Viewed in light of the recent Federal Circuit decision
in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC. V. Int’l Trade Comm’n,3 this comment will first introduce the
reader to the overarching issue of electronic vs. physical importation of goods, review the general
powers and procedures of the International Trade Commission, examine the ClearCorrect
decision, and argue that the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc or, in the alternative, the Supreme
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Court, should affirm the Federal Circuit panel’s decision and determine that electronic
transmissions are not included under the umbrella of “articles,” and that the term “articles” is
meant only to apply to tangible goods. It will be shown that when Congress wrote Section 337,
its unambiguous desire was for the International Trade Commission to have jurisdiction solely
over tangible goods. If Congress now wishes to grant the International Trade Commission vast
powers that include jurisdiction over intangible goods and electronic data transmissions, it should
amend Section 337 or create new legislation explicitly granting an agency, or multiple agencies
acting in concert, the power to stop the importation of any good, whether tangible or intangible.
To that end, the author has attempted to address some of the common concerns that may
present themselves when attempting to control the importation of intangible, electronic
transmissions.
I. Introduction
The roots of intellectual property protection in the United States date back to origins of
the nation. The founding fathers recognized that technology would best progress and new
inventions would be encouraged if inventors were given the sole ability to exploit their inventions
for a limited time. Therefore, “in order to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,”4
Congress granted inventors limited-time monopolies over the invention of a process, machine,
article of manufacture, or composition of matter that was new, non-obvious, and useful.5 These
limited monopolies became known as patents, and they give the patent holder the right to
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exclude others from copying his or her invention in exchange for a full disclosure that would allow
a person of ordinary skill in the art to reconstruct the invention in question.
When a patent holder seeks to exercise their monopolistic right in the patent’s subject
matter against a perceived infringer they generally have two options. The first is to bring an
action against the accused infringer in federal district court, which has jurisdiction over all
intellectual property disputes.6 However, this course of action has its limitations, notably
because district courts must be concerned with the standing of the litigants and have the power
to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. The second option is used when an infringing product
is partly or wholly made overseas and imported into the United States. A patent holder can file
a complaint with the ITC, whose remedies are much narrower than federal courts, and mainly
include the ability to stop the importation of infringing goods before they enter the country
through the use of remedial orders.7 The ITC also has the power to issue cease and desist orders
to stop domestic parties from engaging in ongoing activities in the country; violation of these
orders can carry with them substantial monetary penalties that can be recovered in District
Court.8 Recently, many intellectual property rights holders have pursued actions before the ITC
instead of the traditional route of going through the district courts because the ITC’s average
length of litigation is much shorter than the time it takes a district court to resolve an issue:
usually 12 to 16 months versus at least 2 to 3 years, respectively.9

6

28 U.S.C. §1338 (2012).
19 U.S.C. §1337 (2012).
8
§1337(f).
9
Mark A. Kressel, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights with the ITC, 34 L.A. LAW. at 10 (Dec. 2011).
7

4

With the advent of the World Wide Web and the proliferation of Internet commerce,
interpretation of the statute that enables the ITC has become critical. The enabling statute, the
Tariff Act, gives the ITC the power to exclude the importation, sale for importation, or sale within
the U.S. after importation of articles that either infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent or
copyright; or are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered
by the claims of a valid and enforceable U.S. patent.10 It is the term “articles,” that modifies the
rest of the statute, which this comment is concerned with. Traditionally, “articles” has been
understood to encompass tangible goods, but the ITC has recently sought to extend the
interpretation of this term to include intangible things, such as electronic transmissions of digital
data sets.11
A case recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit12 may have farreaching consequences on how the term “articles” is interpreted. The case was a judicial review
stemming from the ITC’s previous decision to interpret “articles” as including electronic data
imported into the United States, thus giving the ITC jurisdiction over said electronic data.13
Furthermore, another recently decided case entitled Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, also a
judicial review of a prior decision of the ITC, held that it was permissible to exclude importation
of tangible goods that were not infringing at the time of importation and were considered staple
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goods, but became infringing products downstream when the staple good was combined with
software that transformed it into an infringing product.14
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, was sharply divided in its decision in Suprema.15 The
6-4 decision showed the multitude of differing opinions on whether the ITC had the ability to
stop the importation of tangible staple goods that would later be used in an infringing product,16
specifically by the addition of electronic software to the tangible staple good. In contrast, a split
three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit in ClearCorrect decided that the ITC did not have the
authority to stop the importation of electronically transmitted data that was later used in the
United States to create an infringing product.17 When viewed together, these two decisions
create an interesting uncertainty when it comes to determining whether the ITC can exclude an
item that will be used downstream in a post-importation marriage of hardware and software,
which has become an increasingly significant form of commerce.18 The sharp split in both cases
also makes ClearCorrect ripe for granting a petition for en banc rehearing19 or, in the alternative,
the chance for the Supreme Court to step in and settle the differing opinions of the Federal Circuit
in both Suprema and ClearCorrect.20
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This comment will review the powers granted to the International Trade Commission and
will argue that the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, or the Supreme Court, should affirm the panel’s
decision not just on the battle of dictionary definitions enunciated in the majority opinion, but
for a variety of other reasons. One such reason is that the ITC has traditionally not been able to
exert its reach in such a sweeping fashion. Moreover, the legislators that wrote Section 337,
using their understanding of technology at the time, did not intend for the statute to reach
electronic transmissions. Accordingly, Congress knowingly expressed their unambiguous intent
that the statute not reach electronic transmissions when they wrote Section 337.21 The ITC has
also traditionally not been able to exert its reach in such a sweeping fashion.
Furthermore, allowing an interpretation of the ITC’s enabling statute that considers
“articles that … infringe” to include intangible things would give the ITC the ability to improperly
use existing patent and intellectual property law to police digital transmissions over the Internet
and effectively expand the scope of exclusive rights granted to intellectual property rights
holders. It will also be suggested that even if the statute is interpreted to include electronic data,
it is not feasible to enforce remedial orders issued by the ITC that cover electronic imports
because of the limitations of Customs and Border Protection.22 If Congress wishes the ITC to be
able to exclude the importation of electronic transmissions, Congress should make that clear
through an amendment or revision to the existing Section 337 and providing a definition of the
term “articles” that includes the transmission of digital data. Finally, if Congress were to grant

21

ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 14-1527 at 3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2015).
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end-user’s privacy concerns and that new pirating methods rendering enforcement methods useless; nevertheless,
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through online auction sites).
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the ITC this power, it needs to provide the ITC with the means to enforce such orders through
inter-agency cooperation and a pooling of resources throughout the government.
II.

Traditional Powers of the International Trade Commission

The ITC is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency that has broad investigative
responsibilities in matters of international trade. Originally, the ITC was established as the U.S.
Tariff Commission in 1916 but assumed its current name along with its current scope of powers
through the Trade Act of 1974.23 Like other administrative agencies, the ITC is a creature of
statute; all of the powers of the agency must originate in a statutory grant of power to the
agency.24 The main power of the ITC is, upon complaint, to adjudicate cases involving the
importation of articles that allegedly infringe valid intellectual property rights in the United
States, thus facilitating a rules-based international trading system.25
The main enabling statute for the ITC as well as the statute being examined in this
comment is 19 U.S.C. §1337 (“Section 337”). The statute deals with unfair practices in import
trade and gives the ITC the power to issue equitable remedies.26 Section 337 grants the ITC broad
powers over the importation of all types of intellectual property including trademarks, mask
works, designs, copyrights, and patents,27 but this comment is concerned specifically with only
two subsections. 19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) deal with:
The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or
the sale within the United States after importation by the owner,
importer, or consignee, of articles that –

23
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(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent or a valid and
enforceable United States copyright registered under title 17; or
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a
process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United
States patent.28
Accordingly, without the importation of an “article,” there can be neither an unfair act nor
anything for the ITC to remedy.
The ITC also acts in a specific, statutorily-determined way when adjudicating issues before
it.29 Upon complaint from a domestic party claiming that infringing materials are being imported
into the United States, the commissioners of the ITC will determine whether to open an
investigation.30 If an investigation is opened, notification must be published in the Federal
Register and, within 45 days of the initiation of the investigation, the ITC must provide a target
date for issuing its final determination.31 The investigation will include formal evidentiary
hearings in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and provide the parties with
adequate notice, the right to cross-examination, objections, and other rights required to have a
fair hearing.32 Once the investigation is complete, the administrative law judge directing the
investigation will rule on the merits of the case and whether he or she believes there to be a
violation of Section 337, called an “initial determination.”33 The administrative law judge can
only make recommendations to the ITC and not order the issuance of one of the equitable
remedies at the ITC’s disposal.34

28
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The ITC then decides whether to review the initial determination of the administrative
law judge. If the commission declines to review the initial determination, it becomes the final
determination of the ITC.35 The ITC can also review and adopt, modify, or reverse the initial
determination.36 If it is determined that Section 337 has been violated, the ITC can order
remedial relief targeting the articles in question.37 Any person adversely affected by the final
determination of the ITC in Section 337 investigations can, within 60 days after the determination
becomes final, request judicial review before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.38
Various federal agencies are involved once the ITC begins an investigation or issues a final
determination.39

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) through its Office of

Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) through its Cyber Crime Division, and
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) through its Office of Criminal Investigations are all
responsible for investigations designed to assist law enforcement actions against those who
commit violations of U.S. intellectual property laws.40 They are, however, mainly concerned with
pharmaceuticals and items that could potentially cause a public health issue.41 The Department
of Justice is responsible for prosecuting alleged violations.42 The agency most important to the
substance of this comment is Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). CBP acts as the ITC’s
enforcement mechanism and has the power to inspect, deny entry to, and seize articles that have

35

THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 3.
Id.
37
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38
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GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT HAS GENERALLY INCREASED, BUT ASSESSING
PERFORMANCE COULD STRENGTHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS (March 2009).
40
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been identified in exclusion orders issued by the ITC.43
While district courts have jurisdiction over all intellectual property litigation, some key
differences exist when attempting to secure a final determination from the ITC. Most significant
are the remedial relief measures available to the ITC including general and limited exclusion
orders as well as cease and desist orders.44 Whereas a district court can directly award monetary
damages as a civil remedy, the ITC does not have the power to do so, although violation of a
cease and desist order can carry heavy fines.45
A limited exclusion order applies only to the parties named in the investigation while a
general exclusion order bars the importation of infringing products by anyone, regardless of
whether they were a party in the ITC’s investigation.46 Because a general exclusion order
potentially affects a greater number of people, one may only be issued if two conditions are
met.47 The general exclusion order must be 1) necessary to prevent circumvention of a limited
exclusion order; and 2) necessary to prevent a pattern of violation where it is difficult to identify
the source of the infringing products.48
There are further differences between exclusion orders and cease and desist orders.
Whereas exclusion orders are generally considered in rem remedies,49 meaning that they are
directed toward the infringing articles themselves, cease and desist orders are purely in

43

Gary M. Hnath, General Exclusion Orders Under Section 337, 25 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 349, 350 (2005).
Kressel, supra note 9, at 2; 19 U.S.C. §1337(d) (2012).
45
§1337(f).
46
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 474 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007); §1337(d).
47
§1337(d).
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See Kyocera, supra note 24, at 1357 (stating that although the parties argue exclusion orders have been considered
strictly in rem in nature, a limited exclusion order that applies to “persons determined by the Commission to be
violating this section” does in fact incorporate an in personam element); §1337(d)(2). See also Michael J. Lyons et
al., Exclusion of Downstream Products After Kyocera: A Revised Framework for General Exclusion Orders, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 821, 831-32 (2009).
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personam in nature, meaning that they are directed to a specific party or person.50 A cease and
desist order can bar someone from importing a certain article as well as curtail or hinder other
activities such as sales and distribution of imported articles that infringe according to the ITC’s
determination.51 While the ITC cannot order monetary damages like a district court, violation of
a cease and desist order carries heavy monetary penalties.52 For each day that importation of
articles, or their sale, in violation of the cease and desist order occurs, the party in violation can
be penalized the greater of up to $100,000 or twice the domestic value of the articles entered or
sold on such day in violation of the order.53 The accrued penalties are payable to the United
States, and the ITC can recover them through a civil action in federal court in the district where
the violation of the order occurred.54
A. Limitations of Customs and Border Protection
As mentioned supra, CBP is the agency that the ITC relies on to enforce its remedial
orders.55 Traditionally, CBP has been able to accomplish this through air, land, and sea patrols at
the nation’s borders. This is how an exclusion order issued by the ITC is enforced: CBP agents are
granted the power to inspect and, if necessary, seize or deny entry to any goods within the scope
of the exclusion order.56 This method of regulating the importation of physical goods to the

50

See Fuji Photo Film, supra note 46, at 1286; 19 U.S.C. §1337(f)(1) (2012).
§1337(f)(1).
52
§1337(f)(2).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See supra text accompanying Section II.
56
Hnath, supra note 43, at 350.
51

12

United States has proven to be effective, with CBP seizing over 23,000 items valued at
approximately $1.25 billion in fiscal year 2014.57
However, despite being the nation’s largest law enforcement agency,58 CBP has
limitations on its ability to police America’s “cyber borders” for potentially infringing content that
is being electronically transmitted into the country.59 CBP operates most effectively at any of the
328 ports of entry60 to the United States where it has the ability to physically inspect all cargo
and agriculture products entering the United States, as well as screen anyone immigrating to the
United States, whether permanently or temporarily.61 Exclusion orders issued by the ITC against
electronic transmissions pose a serious problem for CBP. These transmissions are not fixed on
any tangible computer-readable medium,62 and they do not come through any ports of entry
patrolled by CBP, and thus they cannot be the subject of “importation” as described by the
statute63 nor can they be forfeited or seized by CBP agents. A holding that includes electronic
transmissions as “articles” under Section 337 would lead to competing definitions of the term
“articles” as it is used in the statute. As propounded by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, a statute
should be read in such a way so that it is consistent throughout and makes sense when viewed

57

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CBP
PUBLICATION NO. 1134-0915, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2014 SEIZURE STATISTICS (2015).
58
CBP
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Overview,
U.S.
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROTECTION
(March
3,
2016),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/video-gallery/2016/01/cbp-mission-overview.
59
Haberman, supra note 22, at 21-22.
60
At Ports of Entry, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (March 4, 2016), http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/portsentry.
61
Operations, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (March 4, 2016), http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/portsentry/operations.
62
See infra text accompanying Section V (discussing how software placed on tangible, computer-readable mediums
has been a valid target of ITC exclusion orders and how this differs from the electronic transmission of digital data
sets.
63
Appellants’ Corrected Response to Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 2, ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Feb. 18, 2016).
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as a whole under the canon of “harmonious reading” of statutes.64 In short, a single word used
many times in a statute should have a single definition; in this case, it should not mean tangible
and capable of being seized upon entry or forfeited to the United States in one part of the statute
while also concurrently covering intangible data transmissions that are not subject to Congress’s
express desire to have CBP be able to police the “articles” in question.
Furthermore, CBP does not have access to the limited number of “control points” that
would allow an organization like CBP to monitor what information is being placed and transferred
on the Internet.65 Even with the help and cooperation of a number of federal agencies, it appears,
and multiple authors have suggested, a task such as excluding certain transmissions from entry
into a country can only be accomplished with the help of Internet Service Providers.66 Such a
level of actively monitoring transmissions and cooperation with private organizations is well
outside the grant of power Congress gave to CBP in Section 337.67 A collaborative effort between
federal agencies, mainly CBP, but also ICE and the FBI, and Internet Service Providers, to regulate
traffic on the Internet in such a way also poses a variety of privacy concerns for the end-user,
including the potential restriction of free speech and violation of end-user’s Fourth Amendment
rights to be free from unlawful search and seizure.68 While certain “packet-sniffing” programs

64

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 180 (2012); See also Brief of the
Internet Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 26, ClearCorrect Operating
LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Oct. 17, 2014).
65
Haberman, supra note 22, at 18 (citing Dan L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION
POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, 205-34 at 206-07 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., MIT Press
1999) (describing how users communicate through digital data packet switching on the Internet and control their
inputs)).
66
See Daniel T. Kane, Printing a War in Three Dimensions: Expending “Article” to Include Electronic Transmissions
Before the ITC, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427, 463-64 (2015). See also Haberman, supra note 22, at 21-25.
67
See generally 19 U.S.C. §1337 (2012).
68
Kane, supra note 66, at 463-464; for more information regarding the potential relationship between ISPs and the
government as well as jurisdictional issues, see Haberman, supra note 22, at 22-25.
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such as the FBI’s “Carnivore” program and Narus’s NarusInsight 8 are able to monitor Internet
activity and have been allowed, albeit not without controversy,69 it would be difficult to extend
the arguments that they protect national security and thwart terrorist attempts to an argument
to protect intellectual property rights.
III.

ClearCorrect Case Origins and Current Status

The case currently subject to a petition for en banc rehearing before the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit that concerns the main subject of this comment is an innocuous one that
does not raise any red flags at first glance: it deals with the alleged infringement of patents
related to orthodontic aligners.70 However, the underlying issues to be decided have far-reaching
consequences. To fully understand the issues involved, we will first look at the procedural history
of the pending case.
The origin of the case begins with a complaint filed with the ITC on behalf of Align
Technology, Inc., manufacturers of the popular INVISALIGN® brand of orthodontic aligners, in
March of 2012.71 The complaint alleged infringement of seven (7) U.S. Patents and violations of
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by respondents ClearCorrect Operating LLC (“CCUS”) and
ClearCorrect Pakistan (Private), Ltd. (“CCPK”).72 CCUS and CCPK were founded by former
directors and a former CEO of Align Technology, Inc.73 CCUS claims that it was necessary to found
a new company that creates similar clear orthodontic aligners to Align’s products to protect the

69

See generally Aaron Y. Strauss, A Constitutional Crisis in the Digital Age: Why the FBI’s “Carnivore” Does Not Defy
the Fourth Amendment, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 231 (2002); Joseph Goodman, Angela Murphy, Morgan
Streetman, & Mark Sweet, Carnivore: Will it Devour Your Privacy?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 28 (2001).
70
ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015) at 4-5.
71
77 Fed. Reg. 20648-49 (April 5, 2012).
72
Digital Models, Comm’n Op. at 2 (Apr. 9, 2015).
73
Id. at 6.
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smaller, independent retailers of these devices and prevent the allegedly predatory practices of
the much larger Align Technology, Inc.74
The patents in question are directed toward systems and methods for repositioning teeth
by a plurality of dental aligners configured to be placed successively on a patient’s teeth with the
end result of incrementally repositioning the patient’s teeth from an initial tooth arrangement to
a final tooth arrangement.75 The claims at issue in the patents include both method and system
claims. To prove infringement of a method claim, the party bringing suit must show that the
defendant actually performed every claimed step of the method and not just had the mere
capability to do so.76 Accordingly, it is helpful to understand the basic claimed method that
produces the patented apparatus.
The dental appliances claimant alleges are being infringed are Align Technology’s
INVISALIGN® products meant to incrementally move and position a patient’s teeth. 77 The
appliance is created by utilizing the protected method of first scanning a patient’s teeth to
determine their starting position.78 The digital data collected in the scan is then used to create a
three-dimensional model of the patient’s teeth.79 From this initial model, the 3D image is
manipulated to reposition individual teeth, thus producing a series of successive data sets
representing a series of successive tooth arrangements.80 The plurality of digital data sets are

74

Align Sues ClearCorrect for Making Clear Aligners Too Affordable, MARKET WIRED (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/align-sues-clearcorrect-for-making-clear-aligners-too-affordable1404372.htm.
75
Digital Models, Comm’n Op. at 7; U.S. Patent No. 6,471,511 at 1.
76
ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., Case Nos. 11-1396; -1456; -1554 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2012).
77
How Invisalign Works, http://www.invisalign.com/how-invisalign-works (last accessed Sep. 22, 2015).
78
U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325 at 15; U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880 at 22.
79
U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325 at 15; U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880 at 22.
80
U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325 at 15; U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880 at 22.
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used to produce a series of positive models of the series of tooth arrangements that are in turn
used to produce the actual dental appliances as a negative of the positive models that were
created.81 A patient will use the successive series of dental appliances to incrementally move his
or her teeth into the ultimately-desired position.
CCUS creates the initial digital data set by taking physical impressions of a patient’s teeth
and scanning the stone models into FreeForm Modeling software, a 3D modeling program.82
These data sets are sent to Pakistan where they are manipulated by CCPK to create the successive
series of data sets that represent the incremental changes in the position of the patient’s teeth.83
The plurality of digital data sets created by CCPK are then uploaded to CCUS’s server for use in
the United States.84 The digital models are then used to print 3D physical models of a patient’s
teeth which form the negative that is used to create the dental positioning adjustment appliances
by applying thermoplastic molding over the negative.85
An administrative law judge initially determined that the ITC had jurisdiction to prohibit
the importation of the allegedly infringing digital data sets because, he reasoned, they are articles
under Section 337.86

Respondents CCUS and CCPK petitioned for review of the initial

determination and argued that the digital data sets were not articles within the meaning of
Section 337(a)(1)(B), nor was the upload from Pakistan to a server in the United States an
importation anticipated by Section 337(a)(1)(B).87
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The ITC, however, affirmed the initial

determination of the administrative law judge that electronic transmissions were “articles” under
Section 337 and the ITC had jurisdiction to regulate their importation. 88 CCUS and CCPK then
filed for judicial review before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit of the ITC’s decision.
The main point of contention between the parties is whether digital transmissions can be
considered “articles” under Section 337 and be within the jurisdiction of the ITC. On November
10, 2015, a divided 2-1 panel of the Federal Circuit held that the ITC’s decision ran “counter to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”89 The panel determined that the ITC’s
construction of “articles” to include intangible things was not entitled to Chevron deference
because Congress’s intent was made clear through the text of the statute.90 The Chevron test
determines whether an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute is entitled to deference
from the judiciary and comprises two questions. First, whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue; if the answer is yes, the judiciary must give effect to Congress’s
unambiguously expressed intent.91 If the answer is no, the reviewing court must move to the
second question: whether “the agency’s answer to the precise question at issue is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”92
The Federal Circuit mainly relied upon definitions of the term “article” from dictionaries
contemporaneous with the authoring of Section 337.93 Even though the Federal Circuit’s opinion
held Chevron step two was unnecessary, it stated that even if step two were to be reached, the
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ITC’s interpretation of “articles” would be considered unreasonable and thus not entitled to any
deference by a reviewing court.94
The ITC as well as Align Technology both filed petitions for an en banc rehearing of the
case by the full Federal Circuit bench on January 27, 2016.95 The parties claimed that the Chevron
test was misapplied, the definition of “articles” was wrongly constructed, and a reversal of the
panel’s decision was appropriate. Appellants ClearCorrect filed its response on February 18, 2016
and, among other arguments presented in favor of affirming the panel’s decision, claimed that
appellees did not present a Chevron argument until after oral arguments.96
IV.

Historical Statutory Interpretation of “Articles” and Whether Data Transmissions Should
be Within the ITC’s Jurisdiction
Traditionally, “articles” that infringe a valid and enforceable intellectual property right or

arise from a patented process have been construed narrowly to include solely tangible items.97
This included things like copyrighted books, trademarked products like designer clothes or shoes,
or reproductions of patented goods, but did not extend to digital communications. The language
of Section 337 has never been interpreted to include transmissions of data, and the existing ways
of transmitting information and data at the time of the ITC’s creation were not placed under their
jurisdiction. A look into the history of the statutory interpretation of the terms in Section 337 or
its predecessors better allows an observer to determine what the intent of Congress was when
the statute was written.
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First it should be established that, as early as 1887, the Supreme Court differentiated
between articles of commerce and data transmissions.98

In Western Union, the Court

contemplated whether it should consider telegrams to be articles of commerce.99 Although there
are clear technological differences between telegraphs and digital data transmissions of the 21 st
century, they seem to be analogous in not only their respective technological breakthroughs at
the time but also in how people communicated and transferred information across long
distances. One could make the argument that telegrams and telegraphs were to the 19th century
what the Internet is to the 21st century today. In its opinion determining that telegrams were not
articles of commerce, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he telegraph transports nothing visible and tangible; it carries
only ideas, wishes, orders, and intelligence. Other commerce
requires the constant attention and supervision of the carrier for
the safety of the persons and property carried. The message of the
telegraph passes at once beyond the control of the sender, and
reaches the office to which it is sent instantaneously. It is plain,
from these essentially different characteristics, that the regulations
suitable for one of these kinds of commerce would be entirely
inapplicable to the other.100
If the quoted passage, written over 120 years ago, were shown to someone today that
was told it was written about the Internet and digital transmissions of information, the argument
could be made that it would be accepted. The Supreme Court considered a related issue 50 years
after its opinion in Western Union. In 1945, the Court interpreted the statutory text “articles or
subjects of commerce” and determined that telegraph messages were “subjects” of commerce
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as opposed to “articles” of commerce.101 Of note in that decision, the Court held that “goods”
were “articles or subjects of commerce” and the telegraph message itself became a subject of
commerce and not an article, but the Court declined to decide whether the electronic impulses
into which the words of the message are transformed were “goods.”102
Furthermore, the schedules included with the Tariff Act of 1930103 imposed duties on all
manner of goods and articles, but they do not even a single time mention “telegraph messages,
radio broadcasts, telephone calls, or other transmissions.”104 The things that the schedules do
impose duties on are the equipment necessary to facilitate things like electronic transmissions;
that is, telephone poles, wires, devices, etc. but not the data transmission itself.105 The grammar
and actual words used by Congress at the time can be looked to for guidance as well. Every time
the legislature used the term “articles” in the Tariff Act, they were describing tangible things. 106
A basic tenant of statutory construction is that intrinsic evidence is used to determine the
meaning of the word, and that a term should generally be read the same way every time it
appears in a statute.107
A final consideration regarding the historical jurisdiction of the ITC is related to another
federal agency, the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”). Just four years after the passing
of the Tariff Act of 1930, the Communication Act of 1934 established the FCC which was
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publicized as a “centralizing authority … with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire
and radio communication.”108 The FCC was created to have “regulatory power over all forms of
electronic communication.”109
Admittedly it is difficult to determine where one agency’s jurisdiction ends and another’s
begins, but the FCC has exclusive regulatory power over matters involving use of the radio
frequency spectrum.110 The FCC’s jurisdiction over electronic transmissions on the Internet can
be further evidenced by the fact that recent attempts at regulating conduct on, and active
surveillance of, the Internet and its content has gone through the FCC. 111 Taken as a whole, the
Supreme Court’s holding of telegraphs as “subjects” and not “articles” of commerce as well as
recent actions by the FCC combined with the temporal proximity of the Tariff Act of 1930 that
established Section 337 and the Communications Act of 1934 that established the FCC, can be
taken as proof that Congress intended to create a bifurcation between tangible “articles”
governed by the ITC and “electronic communications” governed by the FCC.
A. The Journey from Telegraphs to the Internet and the Intent of Congress
It was not the intent of the authors of the statute to include the presently-discussed types
of electronic transmissions under the Act’s umbrella.

We now clearly understand the

technological differences between telegrams and massive Internet transmissions, but the
interpreter must put themselves in the shoes of the authors of the statute and determine what
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they would think based on their knowledge of the time. Although the authors of the statute
could not have contemplated the breadth and innovations that the Internet would bring as well
as the amount of information that could be sent in a single message, the basic underlying theory
of the decisions cited above still stands: that tangible instruments sending the signals are articles
and the transient electronic information being sent through the articles are subjects of commerce
and not articles themselves. Congress at the time also may not have been able to contemplate
the Internet per se, but they could easily understand the international transmission of
telecommunications data.112 If Congress wished to include intangible data among articles of
commerce, Congress would have made that clear when they drafted the Tariff Act of 1930.
The comparison between telegraphs and the Internet continues beyond Congress
knowing of telegraphs’ existence and that they can carry intangible data. Telegraphy itself is the
process of using a form of communication known to both sender and receiver to transmit data.113
Such a definition could be used also to explain what it is the Internet “does.” Miriam Webster
defines a telegraph as “an apparatus for communication at a distance by coded signals;
especially: an apparatus, system, or process for communication at a distance by electric
transmission over wire.”114 When reduced to its purest form, the digital data sets at issue in
ClearCorrect are exactly that – coded signals communicated over a distance by electric
transmission. Another telegraphic example would be Morse Code. When considering Morse
Code, which employs a series of long and short electric signals to form letters of the alphabet, it
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is not a long stretch of the imagination to envision the long and short dashes and dots being the
“ones and twos” of binary code of their day.
Another similar parallel of the digital transmissions in question here to a technology longexisting at the time the statute was written is the operation of computers and a type of optical
telegraphy known as the shutter telegraph. When two modern computers exchange a byte, or
an eight-bit binary number, they are performing a task that is functionally similar to the actions
that an eight-panel shutter telegraph115 would have done 200 years ago, which was also
understood and contemplated by Congress when they wrote the Tariff Act in 1930.116 The
difference, outside the obvious of electricity and use of relay stations, is that a computer today
may use ASCII instead of a codebook to relate each combination of eight-bit sequences into a
different word or action.117
Furthermore, the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) determines the
protocols used by modems currently, but the ITU was originally founded as the International
Telegraph Union in 1865 with the goal of regulating international telegraphy.118 Clearly the
operators of the ITU, part of the United Nations system, saw the close parallel between
telegraphy and the technology that allows us to communicate over the Internet. Accordingly, it
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should not be considered lightly that the Tariff Act intentionally did not include telegraphs, whose
modern day equivalent is arguably digital data transmissions over the Internet.
In general, many similarities can be drawn between telegraphs and the Internet. The
telegraph served as the infrastructure for dynamic globalization of economic activities in the late
19th and early 20th centuries;119 the two technologies were the defining communications
technology of their respective eras; and perhaps most significantly, the legacy for both
technologies is the increase in the speed of long-distance communications.120 There have even
been scholars that have presented arguments that all things being considered, the telegraph had
a greater impact on communications than the Internet.121
Because of all these various analogs between telegraphs and current digital transmission
of data, it is not a far stretch of the imagination to believe that when Congress excluded
telegraphs and telegrams from their understanding of “articles” in 1930, they also were intending
to exclude similar future technologies such as electronic transmissions over the Internet.
Accordingly, the electronic transmissions in questions should be excluded from being considered
“articles” within the interpretation of Section 337.
V.

The ITC’s Past Treatment of Digital Data

An en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should affirm the panel’s decision and
not accept the ITC’s interpretation that intangible electronic transmissions are “articles” not only
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because Congress never intended for the ITC to have such far-reaching jurisdiction, but also
because the interpretation the ITC seeks would vastly expand the jurisdiction it has asserted up
until this point. In the final Commission Opinion, the majority acknowledged the construction of
the term “articles” is a difficult one because the term itself is not defined in the statute.122
Furthermore, in his dissent to the commission’s opinion, Commissioner Johanson referred to
whether the electronic transmission of digital data into the United States constitutes importation
of an “article” as an issue of first impression.123 To allow the ITC to determine what they do and
do not have jurisdiction over on an ad hoc basis would stop the ITC from being a creature of
statute and transform it into a creature of its own making. In the Initial Determination in
ClearCorrect, the ITC held it had specific jurisdiction over digital data sets because they were
“articles” under Section 337 and specifically pointed to three prior cases that it claimed shows
electronically transmitted data has always been considered to be an “article” under Section
337.124
The first, and most recent, case is one where in 2007 the ITC issued a cease and desist
order barring the electronic transmission of infringing antivirus software.125 The ITC also issued
a limited exclusion order, but that order only excluded the infringing antivirus software in a
tangible medium.126 The ITC reasoned that, although it believed itself to have jurisdiction over
electronic data, it did not believe Customs and Border Protection had the resources to enforce
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an exclusion order against intangible items,127 hence why they did not include them in the
exclusion order. However, the ITC believed that a cease and desist order that did not include
electronic transmissions of the infringing antivirus software would “allow for an obvious method
of circumvention such that the cease and desist order would be rendered meaningless.” 128
The cease and desist order was aimed at antivirus software in the United States because
it was shown that the respondent had a commercially significant inventory of infringing products
in the country already.129 The commission determined there was no difference between the
electronic transmissions of the software or software that was transferred to a tangible
medium.130
Whereas the software in question was a finished product, ready to be installed and run
on a computer, the digital data sets at issue in ClearCorrect are not software.131 The digital data
sets do not control functions or direct operations like the antivirus software.132 Also, in contrast
to the above situation where the ITC issued a cease and desist order against electronic
transmissions in an effort to stop circumvention of the order to not sell the antivirus software on
tangible mediums, ClearCorrect’s digital data sets are not stored on a disk or any other tangible
medium; they are purely electronic. Furthermore, the antivirus software of the respondent in
the above case was directly infringing the claimant’s patent because it performed every step of
the protected method. Here, not every step of the method is infringed; the digital data sets are
no less than three steps removed before they could be in an infringing state.
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In Certain Set Top Boxes and Components Thereof (“Set Top Boxes”), the ITC determined
there was no Section 337 violation in respondent’s importation of television boxes that
downloaded software to display a guide of programs airing on various television networks.133
The ITC stated in dicta that Section 337 is “broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair
practice, including the transmission of infringing software by electronic means ….”.134 In its
holding, however, the ITC declined to issue any remedial orders directed to the products at issue,
specifically rejecting a proposition to issue an exclusion order directed at satellite transmissions
of allegedly infringing software and/or program schedule data even if the commission found a
violation of Section 337.135 However, similar to the antivirus software case above, the ITC noted
that should a violation be found, the ITC could issue a cease and desist order prohibiting the
electronic transmission of respondents’ software which is found to infringe the asserted claims
at issue.136
Again, however, the ITC is playing both sides: it claims to be able to regulate electronic
transmissions of software, but only would allow itself to do so through a cease and desist order
and not an exclusion order because of its deference to the practical capabilities of CBP.137 This is
another point of contention in the ongoing litigation. Can a cease and desist order be authorized
in a situation where an exclusion order is unavailable? Section 337’s language leads to the
conclusion that a cease and desist order is designed to accompany an exclusion order, or be a
step toward what could ultimately be an exclusion order.138 A cease and desist order can be
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issued “[i]n addition to” or “in lieu of” an exclusion order.139 Clearly a cease and desist order
cannot be “in addition to” an exclusion order in a situation where an exclusion order is
unavailable. Proponents of reversing the ITC’s decision in Digital Models have said as much,
stating that cease and desist orders are meant to be “a supplemental remedy that was never
intended to gap-fill situations where an exclusion order would be illogical.”140
Furthermore, a cease and desist order that is issued “in lieu of” an exclusion order may
be “modif[ied] or revoke[d] and, in the case of revocation, [the ITC] may [issue an exclusion
order].”141 This language can be interpreted rationally only if a cease and desist order is a limited
version of an exclusion order and rightly considered a step on the path to securing an exclusion
order, and not an “independent alternative.”142 To hold that a cease and desist order can
function as a stand-alone remedy and ignore the interplay between the two remedial measures
would produce an unharmonious interpretation of a statute.143 As stated in one of the many
briefs submitted to the Federal Circuit, by interpreting the statute to include intangible things as
“articles,” the ITC is “[c]reating a statutory liability that inherently cannot be remedied by the
only enforcement tools provided” and would be a presumptively unreasonable statutory
construction.144
Finally, reaching the case that provided the impetus for the two previously-cited ITC
adjudications, in Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof
(“Hardware Logic”), the ITC issued a permanent limited exclusion order and a permanent cease
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and desist order against respondent Mentor.145 The orders were directed to the accused
“hardware logic emulation systems and component thereof, including software.”146 (emphasis
added) The products in question comprised hardware and software that temporarily embodied
substantial digital logic networks used to design and test the electronic circuits of semiconductor
devices.147 In a twist from the two adjudications already discussed, the exclusion order and the
cease and desist order also covered the software needed to run the devices, which could be
electronically transmitted into the United States.148

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”)

reasoned that the software was an integral part of the infringing emulation system and was thus
contributorily infringing a valid U.S. intellectual property right.149 The ALJ stated that the
software bore “a direct relationship to the infringing imported emulation systems.150
Proponents of an interpretation of Section 337 that would include intangible things as
articles point to Hardware Logic as ITC precedent that shows it has jurisdiction over electronic
transmission of data, but that is a misinterpretation of what Hardware Logic says. The imported
article at issue in Hardware Logic was a tangible emulation system that required software to run
it. The software could be included with the hardware at the time of importation or put on a disc
or other tangible medium and installed at a later time. The ITC determined that no customer
would purchase the emulation system if they did not have access to the software.151 It was the
software on a tangible, computer-readable medium – a physical article capable of importation –
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that the ITC entered an exclusion order against. It was only to avoid a circumvention of its
exclusion order that the ITC issued a cease and desist order that targeted the electronic
transmission of the software.152 This line of reasoning was also used in the two previously-cited
adjudications to validate the issuance of a cease and desist order directed toward electronic
transmissions of software.
Responding to this way of using cease and desist orders, in his dissent in Digital Models
Commissioner Johanson stated that the “Commission’s remedy may go beyond merely stopping
the actual violation that triggered the Commission’s jurisdiction and also include ‘reasonably
related’ acts that would result in circumvention of the Commission’s order.”153 This cease and
desist order targeting electronic transmissions of software would come under the previouslystated unreasonable statutory construction because the electronic transmission of the software
is not something that could be stopped by exclusion order. Assuming arguendo that the ITC can
issue cease and desist orders against things that cannot be reached by an exclusion order as
discussed above, further argument can be made to distinguish the three prior adjudications and
ClearCorrect.
In ClearCorrect, the ITC is asserting original jurisdiction over the electronic transmissions
that it would be illogical to issue an exclusion order against whereas in Hardware Logic the cease
and desist order was directed to something imported as part of an infringing emulation system
that the ITC had jurisdiction over.154 In other words, the cease and desist order in Hardware Logic
actually was designed to stop respondent from circumventing the exclusion order while the
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recommendations of the ALJ in Digital Models were not. Any remedial order that issues in Digital
Models would ignore the circumvention aspect of the equation and support an understanding
that the ITC has original jurisdiction over the digital data sets regardless of the existence of an
exclusion order directed to tangible articles that no one contests the ITC has jurisdiction over.
The prior ITC adjudications discussed above are all examples of software that could be
used in its current state to infringe another product. The only step that needed to take place was
the software being transferred to a tangible medium and it would be excluded through the
exclusion order. The argument can be made that there is a limit to the degrees of separation
between the data transmissions in question and the ultimately infringing product. The Hardware
Logic order reached object code as well as source code, arguably “one step removed” from usable
binary because source code is not executable by the emulation system until it is compiled into
computer-readable object code.155 The ITC determined that the source code in Hardware Logic
contributorily infringed the products at use and could be the target of a remedial order because
the “substance – the intellectual property – of software is most clearly embodied in the
programmer’s source code.”156
The digital data sets in ClearCorrect are not infringing articles because they are multiple
steps removed from an infringing product that Section 337 seeks keep out of the country. The
“substance” that the ITC spoke about in Hardware Logic is too distant to be used against the data
sets. The data transmissions at issue in ClearCorrect are not virtual representations of the dental
appliances worn by patients.157 The data sets, once received in the United States, have to be first
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loaded into a software program to make them machine-readable.158 Next, the machine-readable
data must be sent to an appropriate apparatus that can read the data and make the physical
models of the dental appliances, such as a 3D printer.159 Lastly, plastic must be shaped over the
physical model to create a negative model to finally end up with the true dental appliance.160
The data sets at issue are at a minimum three steps removed from being the physical dental
appliance. Rather than being an infringing thing itself, the digital data sets, which by their nature
of being electronic should not be considered “articles” under Section 337 at all, are actually a
“transmission of information made during a manufacturing process.”161
However, while this reading would have no digital data set ever be an infringing article by
its very nature, opponents of this line of reasoning will allege even if the data transmissions are
not “articles that infringe,” they still can be properly considered to represent part of a patented
process or a step in a method claim of a patent in question and thus the importer may be liable
for inducing infringement downstream. At the time the original briefs in ClearCorrect were filed,
induced infringement downstream without direct infringement at the time of importation was
not possible. However, with a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
interpretation of induced infringement has changed.
VI.

The Suprema Decision and Induced Infringement

Suprema dealt with the ITC’s interpretation that Section 337 did in fact cover the
importation of goods that, after importation, are used by the importer to directly infringe at the
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inducement of the goods’ seller.162 The facts of the case involve the importation of optical
scanning devices and the ITC’s issuance of an exclusion order directed to the scanning devices
under the theory that the importer was inducing a third party to infringe a valid U.S. patent.163
The scanning devices themselves were not “articles that infringe” at the time of import, but they
included a software development kit (“SDK”) to generate the software that was necessary to
operate the devices.164 An American company used the SDK’s to write its own software and then
bundled and resold the scanners and software in the U.S.165
The ITC determined that Suprema, the foreign company, willfully blinded itself to the
American company’s activities and “deliberately shielded itself from the infringing activities it
actively encouraged and facilitated [the American company] to make.”166 The parallel in the
current case would be CCPK is inducing CCUS to infringe valid intellectual property rights held by
Align. A main contention to keep in mind is that the optical scanners of Suprema were tangible
goods, subject to the original jurisdiction of the ITC and its remedial powers, whereas the data
sets in ClearCorrect are intangible.
In Suprema, the Federal Circuit determined that the ITC’s actions were due to an
interpretation of their statutory grant of power and conducted a Chevron analysis.167 The court
held that Section 337 was ambiguous as to inducement to infringe without direct infringement
at the time of importation.168 The majority determined the main legal question was whether
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there could be an “article that infringes” at the time of importation when the infringement did
not happen until well after the importation.169 In its discussion of the issue, the Federal Circuit
focused not on “articles” but on “infringe” and what Congress’s intent was when they wrote
“articles that infringe.”170 The court held that the infringement Congress was referring to was
not simply direct infringement at the time of importation, but also indirect infringement including
induced infringement after importation.171 Thus, the court held that the ITC’s reading of “articles
that infringe” in Section 337 to include “goods that were used by an importer to directly infringe
post-importation as a result of the seller’s inducement” is reasonable and deserving of Chevron
deference.172
Suprema can be distinguished from ClearCorrect by a simple but important difference:
the goods at issue in Suprema were physical, tangible optical scanners while the alleged “articles”
in ClearCorrect were intangible data transmissions. The argument was not presented in Suprema
that the ITC never had jurisdiction over the objects being imported themselves; rather, the
argument was whether the ITC had the right to exclude a non-infringing good at the time of
import if the seller was inducing downstream infringement.
Furthermore, it was suggested by the dissent that no ambiguity in the statutory language
actually exists, and the majority strained to find an ambiguity where there was none in order to
rationalize providing the ITC’s interpretation with Chevron deference.173 According to their
reasoning, and the justification provided by the majority, the case was decided on public policy
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grounds; however, the judiciary is not the proper place to address public policy concerns – that
task is left to Congress.174 In dissent, four judges of the nine-judge court sitting en banc went on
to agree that “[t]he majority fails … to identify an actual ambiguity in the statute” and that the
“word ‘articles’ is not ambiguous – it has a well-defined legal definition.”175 It appears at least
four judges on the Federal Circuit spoke to the direct point that is at issue in this comment as
well as a potential en banc rehearing: that “article” connotes a physical, tangible object and is
not ambiguous.176
The majority also interchanges the terms “goods” and “articles” throughout its opinion,
further lending credence to the opinion that articles are tangible things. Counsel for ClearCorrect
pointed out as much to the panel, arguing that the Suprema majority’s treatment of the two
terms as synonyms “comports with the [ITC’s] past position that electronic data is different from
the traditional concept of ‘articles.’”177 Using the Suprema majority’s public policy argument that
Section 337 was designed “to stop the entry of goods at the border,” an argument can be further
made in support of the panel’s holding in ClearCorrect that the electronic data transmissions are
not “goods” by any dictionary or legal definition, and thus are not subject to the ITC’s
jurisdiction.178
The Suprema decision, although seemingly closely related to the decision in ClearCorrect,
is distinguishable on multiple levels and mainly concerns a different area of original jurisdiction
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that Congress granted to the ITC. The holding in Suprema expressly speaks to the definition of
“infringement” at the time of importation, but not to what exactly the “articles” are that the ITC
has the ability to exclude from importation. Because the tangible products in Suprema were later
combined with intangible electronic data to create infringing products that gave rise to the
finding of indirect infringement of the seller, many importers and indeed courts may look to the
Suprema decision for guidance on matters that fall more properly under the ClearCorrect
umbrella. This presents an uncertain area in the law that the Supreme Court can clarify if it were
to hear arguments related to ClearCorrect and Suprema should the Federal Circuit sitting en banc
disagree with the panel’s decision.
VII.

Conclusion

The ClearCorrect case presents an opportunity for the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, sitting en banc, or the Supreme Court, to clarify an area of the law that has been
misinterpreted by the agency tasked with enforcing it. A reviewing court should affirm the
present panel decision because it is in accordance with the unambiguously expressed intention
of Congress. This has been shown through Congress’s understanding of technology at the time
it wrote the statute, and reinforced by the inconsistent, if not impossible, enforcement of
remedial orders that would result from a reading of the statute that equated “articles” with
intangible, electronic transmissions.
Moreover, it was also shown that the present enforcement mechanisms for the ITC’s
remedial orders cannot properly function to stop the transmission of digital data packets in its
current form. Any reviewing court, in denying the ITC’s authority to regulate the electronic
transmission of data and other intangible things, would also be providing a public service by
37

sending a message to Congress that if indeed it wishes to imbue the ITC with such power, it must
also provide a way for the agency to enforce that power. A partnership with Internet Service
Providers, an expansion of the cross-agency cooperation that already exists, or the creation of a
new entity to regulate the transmissions in question are potential remedies, but that is a task
that must be left to Congress. By the letter of the law that Congress clearly set forth, the ITC
does not have the power to exclude digital data transmissions into the United States and thus
the panel decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must be affirmed by a reviewing
court.
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